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I. INTRODUCTION
During the last several decades, a considerable amount of litigation
and scholarly commentary has focused on the concept of "employment at
will," the right of either employer or employee freely to terminate an em-
ployment relationship. This Comment will analyze the current status of the
employment at will doctrine. It will (1) examine the history and operation
of the traditional doctrine; (2) discuss current judicial treatment of the em-
ployment at will doctrine with particular emphasis on methods by which
courts now are limiting the doctrine's operation; and (3) analyze problems
1
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that may arise as a result of the courts' attempts to limit or abolish the
employment at will doctrine.
II. THE TRADITIONAL EMPLOYMENT AT WILL DOCTRINE
An employment relationship basically is one of principal and agent.'
The employer has no obligation to continue offering work to the employee,
and the employee is under no obligation to continue working for the em-
ployer.2 Either party may terminate the relationship "'at any time, with-
out cause or reason, or for any reason,' , making an employment
relationship truly at the "will" of the parties.4 Of course, should the rela-
tionship terminate, the employer must pay the employee for any work actu-
1. "A master is a species of principal, and a servant is a species of agent."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 comment a (1958).
2. The parties may agree to limit the employer's power to discharge the em-
ployee. Such an agreement, if binding on the employer, would modify the ordinary
principal-agent relationship. See note 10 and accompanying text infra.
3. Amaan v. City of Eureka, 615 S.W.2d 414, 415 (Mo. En Banc 1981) (quot-
ing Christy v. Petrus, 365 Mo. 1187, 1189, 295 S.W.2d 122, 124 (En Banc 1956)),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1084 (1981).
4. The Restatement makes it clear that either party can terminate the em-
ployment relationship at any time:
Promises by a principal to employ and by an agent to serve are inter-
preted as promises to employ and to serve at the agreed rate only so long
as either party wishes, if no time is specified and no consideration for en-
tering into the relation is given other than the promise in general terms to
employ or to serve ....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 442 comment a (1958). See also Amaan v.
City of Eureka, 615 S.W.2d 414, 415 (Mo. En Banc 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1084
(1981); Carr v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 363 S.W.2d 571, 574 (Mo. 1962); Christy
v. Petrus, 365 Mo. 1187, 1189, 295 S.W.2d 122, 124 (En Banc 1956); Williams v.
Jones, 562 S.W.2d 391, 395 (Mo. App., St. L. 1978).
Recent decisions in other jurisdictions indicate that the at will doctrine re-
mains a potent defense against employee claims arising from discharges. See Phil-
lips v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 651 F.2d 1051, 1054-55 (5th Cir. 1981)
(applying Georgia and Texas law); Rose v. Eastern Neb. Human Servs. Agency,
510 F. Supp. 1343, 1356 (D. Neb. 1981); Daniel v. Magma Copper Co., 127 Ariz.
320, 322, 620 P.2d 699, 701 (Ct. App. 1980); Quigley v. Laventhol & Howarth, 382
So. 2d 137, 138 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Ohio Table Pad Co. of Indiana v. Ho-
gan, - Ind. App. -, -, 424 N.E.2d 144, 145-46 (1981); Abrisz v. Pulley Freight
Lines, Inc., 270 N.W.2d 454, 455 (Iowa 1978) (dicta); Murphy v. City of Topeka-
Shawnee County Dep't of Labor Servs., 6 Kan. App. 2d 488, 497, 630 P.2d 186, 192
(1981) (dicta); Jackson v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 393 So. 2d 243, 245
(La. Ct. App. 1980); Kelley v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So. 2d 874, 874-75
(Miss. 1981); Feola v. Valmont Indus., 208 Neb. 527, 533, 304 N.W.2d 377, 381
(1981); Gonzales v. United S.W. Nat'l Bank, 93 N.M. 522, 524, 602 P.2d 619, 621
(1979); Bennett v. Eastern Rebuilders, Inc., 52 N.C. App. 579, 582, 279 S.E.2d 46,
48-49 (1981); Yartzoff v. Democratic-Herald Publishing Co., 281 Or. 651, 655, 576
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ally performed.'
Before the industrial revolution, English law imposed certain duties on
masters and servants.6 The law required all able bodied men to work. The
law also required masters to retain servants for a certain time, usually a
year, in the absence of a specific agreement. A master could discharge his
servant before the end of that term for certain reasons such as disloyalty.7
These English principles were carried over into American law.8 By the end
of the nineteenth century, however, American courts had developed the
concept of employment at will.9
There are numerous exceptions to and limitations on the employment
at will doctrine. Most collective bargaining agreements limit the em-
ployer's right to discharge his employees.' 0 Federal Civil Service statutes
protect many government employees." Due process limitations on govern-
mental action affect discharges of non-Civil Service government employ-
ees." Federal anti-discrimination statutes prohibit all employers from
discharging an employee for various reasons, including race,' 3 color, reli-
P.2d 356, 359 (1978); Ross v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 273 S.C. 764, 765-66, 259 S.E.2d
814, 815 (1979). See also Annot., 62 A.L.R.3d 271 (1975).
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 452 (1958) ("[I]f the principal has
contracted to pay the agent for his services and the relation terminates ... ,the
principal is subject to liability to pay . . . the agent for services previously per-
formed . . . ."). The Restatement makes it clear that this rule applies to at will
employment relationships. "The rule stated in . . . [section 452] applies where the
principal or agent exercises a privilege of terminating the relation . . . because the
employment was at will . . . ." Id. § 452 comment a.
6. See 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 459-64 (4th ed.
1936).
7. The English Statutes of Labourers defined the parties' duties in a master
and servant relationship. These statutes were impelled by the labor shortage in
England that resulted from the "Black Death." See id.
8. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 600-09, 292
N.W.2d 880, 885-90 (1980).
9. For a discussion of the at will doctrine's development, see id. The Toussaint
court cited H. WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (1877) and discussed the book's
impact on the law of master and servant in the United States. 408 Mich. at 601-03,
292 N.W.2d at 886-87.
10. See Peck, Unjust Discharges From Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law,
40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 8 nn.43 & 44 (1979).
11. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (Supp. V 1981).
12. Due process limitations on discharges of non-civil service employees may
not cover at will employees. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348 (1976); Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573-75 (1972). But see Cresap v. County of San
Diego, 121 Cal. App. 3d 591, 599, 175 Cal. Rptr. 402, 409-10 (1981) (at will em-
ployee with six years service entitled to fair procedure before discharge). For a dis-
cussion of the merits of applying minimal due process standards to all employment
relationships, see Peck, supra note 10, at 42.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976); id. § 2000e-2(a).
1983)
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gion, sex, national origin, union membership,1 5 and age. 1 6 Many states
have similar anti-discrimination statutes that limit the grounds on which an
employer can discharge an employee. 17 Where statutory or constitutional
limitations are not applicable, however, most states allow employers to dis-
charge employees without cause
1 8
Many scholars recently have questioned the soundness of the employ-
ment at will doctrine. 9 The critics set forth several lines of attack: (1) em-
ployees generally do not have bargaining strength equal to that of their
employers, so traditional contract law doctrines should not be applied to
employment relationships;20 (2) an employer's interest in determining his
own business affairs should be subordinated to the employee's interest in job
security;2 1 (3) several seemingly outrageous decisions based on the at will
doctrine allow employers to fire employees for reasons that offend public
policy.
22
The doctrine's opponents have proposed various reforms, including a
requirement that employers discharge employees only for "good cause" 23
and imposition of tort liability on employers for "wrongful" discharge. 24
Most courts have not adopted these proposals;25 they tend to scrutinize em-
ployee discharges on the basis of traditional contract or tort law.
III. THE EMPLOYMENT AT WILL DOCTRINE IN TRADITIONAL
CONTRACT AND TORT LAW
Some jurisdictions no longer rigidly apply the at will doctrine. The
divergence is broadly based, encompassing theories of contract law, tort
law, and precepts of public policy favoring employment security. Despite
14. Id § 2000e-2(a).
15. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1976); Railway Labor
Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152(4) (1976).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1976).
17. See, e.g., Illinois Human Relations Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, § 2-102
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981); Kansas Act Against Discrimination, KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 44-1009 (1981); Missouri Fair Employment Practices Act, Mo. REv. STAT.
§§ 296.010-.070 (1978).
18. See, e.g., cases cited note 4 supra.
19. See, e.g., Blackburn, Restricted Employer Discharge Rights. A Changing Concept of
Employment at Will, 17 AM. Bus. LJ. 467, 470 (1980); Blades, Employment at Will vs.
Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L.
REV. 1404, 1405-06 (1967); Peck, supra note 10, at 1.
20. See Blackburn, supra note 19, at 486; Note, A Common Law Action for the Abu-
sively Discharged Employee, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1435, 1456 (1975).
21. See Blackburn, supra note 19, at 470.
22. See Blades, supra note 19, at 1405. See also notes 171-72 and accompanying
text infra.
23. See Blackburn, supra note 19, at 484.
24. See Blades, supra note 19, at 1435; Note, supra note 20, at 1464.
25. See, e.g., cases cited note 4 supra.
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this change, however, little authority exists for complete abandonment of
the doctrine. Many courts that have held for employees in specific cases




The ultimate issue in an employee discharge dispute usually is whether
the employer may discharge his employee without just or good cause. 27
Courts often are faced with a discharged employee's allegation that the em-
ployer violated an agreement to discharge him only for good cause. Courts
that find for the employee often fail to explain clearly whether they are
imposing obligations on employers regardless of the parties' intent 28 or
whether they are granting relief to the employee because the parties agreed
to binding contractual obligations. 29 This failure leads to great confusion
as to the precise legal theories involved. For example, most cases refer to at
will employment relationships as "contracts," despite the inconsistency of
those terms.3 ° Notwithstanding this confusion, it is important to distinguish
the legal theories involved because the employee's remedy may be signifi-
26. See, e.g., R.S. Mikesell Assocs. v. Grand River Dam Auth., 627 F.2d 211,
212 (10th Cir. 1980) (at will doctrine applicable but parties' omission of express
term governing length of relationship not fatal to employee's claim); Scaramuzzo v.
Glenmore Distilleries Co., 501 F. Supp. 727, 732 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (indefinite employ-
ment at will but definite employment term may be found from circumstances);
Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 321-22, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 922
(1981) (at will doctrine subject to exceptions for public policy and contract); Cleary
v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 450, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 726 (1980)
(employer's right to terminate not absolute); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield,
408 Mich. 579, 610, 292 N.W.2d 880, 890 (1980) (presumption against employment
being at will when employer's policy statements seem to grant job security); Schi-
pani v. Ford Motor Co., 102 Mich. App. 606, 611-15, 302 N.W.2d 307, 309-11
(1981) (at will employment doctrine recognized, but subject to employee contention
that employer's job security promises be enforced to prevent injustice).
27. "Just cause [for firing an employee] means some substantial shortcoming
detrimental to the employer's interests . . . , which the law and a sound public
opinion recognize as a good cause for his dismissal . . . . Instances of repeated
conduct insufficient of themselves may accumulate so as to provide just cause for
dismissal." In re Brooks, 135 Vt. 563, 568, 382 A.2d 204, 207 (1977) (citations
omitted).
28. Although the courts refer to many obligations that they impose without
regard to the parties' intent as "contractual," the law does not require proof of an
actual agreement. See J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, THE LAw OF CONTRACTS § 1-12
(2d ed. 1977); 1 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 19 (1963).
29. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 623, 292
N.W.2d 880, 896-97 (1980) (employer must discharge for cause only if he so
promises).
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cantly different depending on which theory is followed."1
1. Actual Employment Contracts
Many disputes over the employer's liability for discharging the em-
ployee center on whether the parties, either expressly or through their ac-
tions,3 2 agreed that the employee would be discharged only for cause and
whether that agreement was binding on the employer.3 3 Even where an
employer agrees to discharge an employee only for cause, courts often find
that the agreement is unenforceable if the employee gave no consideration
for the employer's promise other than his services as an employee. This rule
is widely known as the "separate consideration" requirement.
Although some courts have discarded this requirement,34 the majority
of jurisdictions hold that an employee is entitled to contractual job security
rights only when he has given some consideration other than services as an
employee. 5 There also is some authority for granting employees relief if
the parties agreed to set the relationship for a definite term regardless of any
31. Often, the remedy awarded to the employee is the most reliable basis for
distinguishing between cases in which courts find the employer breached a contrac-
tual agreement and cases in which courts base the employee's recovery on detrimen-
tal reliance. When the employer breaches his duties in a contractual relationship,
the measure of damages is the unpaid balance of the employee's salary through the
end of the employment term. See Alpern v. Hurwitz, 644 F.2d 943, 945 (2d Cir.
1981); In re Adams Laboratories, Inc., 3 Bankr. 503, 514 (E.D. Va. 1980); Fogleman
v. Peruvian Assocs., 127 Ariz. 504, 506, 622 P.2d 63, 65 (Ct. App. 1980); Vieira v.
Robert's Hawaii Tours, Inc., 630 P.2d 120, 122-23 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1981). In con-
trast, when the employee recovers under a detrimental reliance theory, the common
view is that the court should limit the employee's recovery instead of granting full
"contractual" relief. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
32. The employer and employee rarely memorialize their agreements and un-
derstandings. Thus, most cases that find an agreement look to the nature and cir-
cumstances of the employment relationship. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc.,
116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 327, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 925 (1981).
33. See, e.g., Collins v. Parsons College, 203 N.W.2d 594, 599 (Iowa 1973) (ac-
tual agreement to not discharge employee supported by consideration); Toussaint v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 623, 292 N.W.2d 880, 896-97 (1980) (pri-
mary emphasis on parties' actual agreement); Hollowell v. Career Decisions, Inc.,
100 Mich. App. 561, 567-68, 298 N.W.2d 915, 919 (1980) (summary judgment for
employer proper when employee failed to show actual agreement).
34. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 324-26, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 917, 924-25 (1981) (separate consideration requirement is rule of construction,
not substance); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 133, 316 A.2d 549, 551
(1974) (no need to show actual contract as condition to contractual recovery).
35. See, e.g., Ryan v.J.C. Penney Co., 627 F.2d 836, 837 (7th Cir. 1980); Collins
v. Parsons College, 203 N.W.2d 594, 599 (Iowa 1973); Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 895, 568 P.2d 764, 769 (1977).
[Vol. 48
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separate consideration." Courts require separate consideration because the
employer's promise to employ and the employee's promise to serve do not
alone create a contract.3 7 Recent cases involving separate consideration
have followed one of two tracks: continued rigid adherence to the separate
consideration requirement3 8 or a more flexible approach in deciding which
benefits to the employer and detriments to the employee are sufficient to
bind the employer to an obligation to discharge the employee only for
cause. 39 It appears that the second of these approaches is emerging as an
important trend.40
Courts have focused on numerous factors in deciding whether an em-
ployee has contractual job security rights. An employer's past representa-
tions concerning his discharge policy have been held to create a contractual
duty to discharge the employee only for cause.4 1 In Toussaint v. Blue Cross
and Blue Shield,4 2 the Michigan Supreme Court held that the employer was
under a contractual duty to discharge the employee only for cause based on
the employer's past oral and written assurances that he would discharge the
employee only for good cause.4 3 The court found that the employer's policy
statements had the effect of generating good will among employees and
thus resulted in a more stable and productive workplace.4 4 These benefits
to the employer were sufficient to make legally binding his promises of job
36. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 611, 292 N.W.2d
880, 891 (1980). See also note 66 and accompanying text infra.
37. See note 4 supra.
38. See, e.g., Ryan v. J.C. Penney Co., 627 F.2d 836, 838 (7th Cir. 1980).
39. See, e.g., notes 41-59 and accompanying text infra.
40. Courts place varying emphasis on the importance of finding an actual
agreement between the parties. Courts tend to be concerned with whether the par-
ties actually made express or implied-in-fact agreements when they focus on em-
ployer representations, the length and quality of an employee's service, the
employer's past termination practice, and the general practice of the employer's
industry. See, e.g., notes 41-51 and accompanying text infra. Courts often are less
concerned with the existence of an actual agreement when focusing on an em-
ployee's detrimental reliance-sacrificing pension rights to accept new employment
and sacrificing secure positions to accept new employment. See, e.g., notes 52-59
and accompanying text infa. These decisions are often result oriented and may
sacrifice legal precision to reach the desired outcome.
41. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 327, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 917, 925 (1981); Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 455-56,
168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 729 (1980); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich.
579, 618-19, 292 N.W.2d 880, 894-95 (1980); Hollowell v. Career Decisions, Inc.,
100 Mich. App. 561, 567-68, 298 N.W.2d 915, 919 (1980). But see Ryan v. J.C.
Penney Co., 627 F.2d 836, 837 (7th Cir. 1980) (employer's representations not
binding).
42. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
43. Id. at 614, 292 N.W.2d at 892.
44. Id at 613, 292 N.W.2d at 892.
1983]
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security.' 5
Courts have looked at various other factors in determining whether an
emjloyer is bound to discharge the employee only for cause: the length of
an employee's service with an employer;46 commendations or promotions
given the employee;4 7 the employer's past termination practices;48 the gen-
eral practice of the employer's trade or industry;49 and whether the em-
ployee released the employer from a claim in return for a job.5" An
employee's accumulation of pension rights, however, apparently will not
warrant a finding of contractual duty.5
Some courts have held that an employee's detrimental reliance52 is a
decisive factor in employee discharge disputes. In Foey v. Community Oil
Co. ,53 an employee moved his family to a place where the employer had
promised him a job. Shortly afterward, the employer discharged him. The
district court held that the employee's reliance on the job promise sup-
ported a jury finding that the parties had made a contract and that the
employer breached that contract. 54 The court noted that such reliance
could be "consideration for establishing a contractual [employment] rela-
45. The court stated, "Having announced the policy, presumably with a view
to obtaining the benefit of improved employee attitudes and behavior and im-
proved quality of the work force, the employer may not treat its promise as illu-
sory." Id at 619, 292 N.W.2d at 895. It seems clear that the court still requires a
showing of some benefit to the promissor-employer to bind him to his promise.
46. See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 327, 171 Cal. Rptr.
917, 925 (1981) (length of employee's service may be ground to find existence of
contract); Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 456, 168 Cal. Rptr.
722, 729 (1980) (length of service may "estop" employer from firing employee with-
out good cause). But see Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 895-96,
568 P.2d 764, 769 (1977) (longevity of service not sufficient consideration for em-
ployment contract).
47. See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 329, 171 Cal. Rptr.
917, 927 (1981) (commendations, promotions, and lack of criticism of employee's
work performance implied promise to discharge only for cause).
48. See id. at 329, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927; Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal.
App. 3d 443, 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 729 (1980); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 618-19, 292 N.W.2d 880, 894 (1980).
49. See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 327, 171 Cal. Rptr.
917, 925-26 (1981) (practice of employer's industry is significant indication of
whether implied-in-fact agreement exists giving employee job security). See also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 442 comment b (1958).
50. See, e.g., Ryan v. J.C. Penney Co., 627 F.2d 836, 837 (7th Cir. 1980) (dicta).
51. See Crownover v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 594 F.2d 565, 565-66 (6th Cir.
1979); Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 896, 568 P.2d 764, 769-
70 (1977).
52. Reliance reasonably induced by another's actions or promises is recognized
as a ground for relief. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
53. 64 F.R.D. 561 (D.N.H. 1974).
54. Id at 563-64.
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tion." 55 Other courts have held employers to contractual duties when em-
ployees sacrificed pension rights accrued at other jobs56 or left old jobs.5 7
However, courts have held that foregoing alternative job opportunities in
reliance on the employment relationship is not sufficient to impose duties
on the employer.5 8 Generally, detrimental reliance has not been a strong
basis for employees alleging that employers breached contractual duties to
discharge only for cause.59
2. Employment Relationships as Adhesion Contracts
Normally, the employer sets the terms of the employment relationship.
This opens up the possibility that courts will apply to such relationships
construction principles applicable to adhesion contracts. In Dangott v. ASG
Industries,6° the Oklahoma Supreme Court construed the terms of an em-
ployer's offer of severance pay strictly against the employer. By viewing the
terms of the employer's offer in a light most favorable to the employee, the
court found that the employee had a contractual right to severance pay
even though the employee was terminable at will.6 1 Once an employee
proves that he had contractual job security rights, courts readily construe
55. Id at 563. By holding that detrimental reliance could serve as considera-
tion, the court seemed to afford the employee an opportunity to recover full con-
tract breach damages. This departs from the common view that detrimental
reliance does not warrant full contract recovery. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
56. See Rowe v. Noren Pattern & Foundry Co., 91 Mich. App. 254, 259-62, 283
N.W.2d 713, 716-18 (1979) (employee gave up soon-to-vest pension rights at old job
when he went to work for new employer).
57. See Collins v. Parsons College, 203 N.W.2d 594, 599 (Iowa 1973) (employee
supplied consideration for binding contract when employer aware that employee
gave up secure job); Rowe v. Noren Pattern & Foundry Co., 91 Mich. App. 254,
259-62, 283 N.W.2d 713, 716-18 (1979) (employee's giving up past job sufficient
reliance to impose duty on employer to fire employee only for good cause).
58. See Milligan v. Union Corp., 87 Mich. App. 179, 183, 274 N.W.2d 10, 12
(1978) (employee's failure to take other employment opportunities "merely prepar-
atory" to beginning new position); Goldstein v. Kern, 82 Mich. App. 723, 727-28,
267 N.W.2d 165, 168 (1978) (plaintiff's rejecting other employment only a neces-
sary step to accepting employer's offer); Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash.
2d 887, 895-96, 568 P.2d 764, 769 (1977) (employee's foregoing alternate employ-
ment is not sufficient consideration to change his at will status).
59. See Parets v. Eaton Corp., 479 F. Supp. 512, 518 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (em-
ployee's giving up another job not sufficient consideration to bind employer to con-
tractual duties); Griffith v. Sollay Foundation Drilling, Inc., 373 So. 2d 979, 981-82
(La. Ct. App. 1979) (plaintiff's moving entire family to accept defendant's employ-
ment offer insufficient consideration to bind employer to contractual duties); Rob-
erts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 896, 568 P.2d 764, 769-70 (1977)
(moving family four times during employment not sufficient consideration).
60. 558 P.2d 379 (Okla. 1976).
61. Id at 383.
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the terms of the employment relationship in his favor.62
Dangott illustrates the potential application of adhesion contract princi-
ples"to the different parts of employment at will relationships. This creates
the possibility that a court will apply these same principles to find that an
employer "agreed" to discharge the employee only for cause. In applying
adhesion contract principles to an employment at will relationship, how-
ever, a court would have to overcome a logical problem. By definition,
employment at will relationships are not contractual.63 Therefore, it might
appear inconsistent for a court to apply contract construction principles to
such relationships. A court might resolve this apparent inconsistency by
borrowing the concept without purporting to apply it according to its tradi-
tional requirements.
3. Definite Term Employment Relationships
The majority view is that "indefinite hirings," where the parties have
not specified the duration of employment, are terminable at will.6 4 If the
employee has given separate consideration for the employer's promise to
discharge him only for cause, the rule may not apply.6 5 If the employee
cannot show separate consideration, however, he probably will have to
62. See Goddard v. South Bay Union High School Dist., 79 Cal. App. 3d 98,
105, 144 Cal. Rptr. 701, 706 (1978); Grossman v. Sherman, 198 Colo. 359, 361, 599
P.2d 909, 911 (1979); Higgins v. Lawrence, 107 Mich. App. 178, 183, 309 N.W.2d
194, 196 (1981); Morton v. E-Z Rake, Inc., - Ind. App. -, -, 397 N.E.2d 609, 613
(1979). But see Katz v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 637, 641
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (rejecting employee's argument that grievance arbitration clause
was unenforceable as adhesion contract); Automatic Sprinkler Corp. v. Anderson,
243 Ga. 867, 869, 257 S.E.2d 283, 285 (1979) (lower court's decision based partly on
adhesion contract principles reversed).
63. They are agency relationships. See note 4 supra.
64. See, e.g., Rose v. Eastern Neb. Human Servs. Agency, 510 F. Supp. 1343,
1356 (D. Neb. 1981); Quigley v. Laventhol & Howarth, 382 So. 2d 137, 138 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Griffith v. Sollay Foundation Drilling, Inc., 373 So. 2d 979,
981 (La. Ct. App. 1979); Amaan v. City of Eureka, 615 S.W.2d 414, 415 (Mo. En
Banc 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1084 (1981).
65. See, e.g., Ohio Table Pad Co. v. Hogan, - Ind. App. -, -, 424 N.E.2d
144, 145-46 (1981) (dicta). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 442
comment a (1958) (employment at will not inferred if parties specify duration of
employment or consideration given for entering into employment relationship).
The type of consideration necessary to bind an employer to discharge only for cause
is open to debate. In Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 917 (1981), the employer had hired the employee for an indefinite term. De-
spite the indefinite term of the relationship, the court, looking at the "totality of the
parties' relationship," held that the employer had a duty to discharge the employee
only for cause. Id at 329, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927. While essentially a separate con-
sideration case, the court based its decision on some of the same factors that courts
following the modem flexible approach have used to bind an employer: (1) length
of the employee's service; (2) the employee's commendations and promotions;
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prove that the relationship was for a definite term in order to prevail.66
Courts may find a definite period of employment even though the par-
ties have not expressly agreed to one. In R. S Miesell Associates v. Grand
River Dam Authority,67 the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit held that the nature, subject matter, and purpose of the employ-
ment demonstrated that the parties intended a definite term relationship
despite their failure to specify a time period.6 8 The court held the contract
term to be the period it would take the employed party to perform his du-
ties under the agreement. 69 The court justified finding a definite term by
noting that "'if the employer makes a promise, either express or implied,
• . .that the employment should continue for a period of time that is either
definite or capable of being determined, that employment is not terminable
'at will' after the employee has begun performance.' "70
In Scaramuzzo v. Glenmore Distilleries Co. ,71 the employer argued that the
parties' relationship was terminable at will because they had not specified a
definite term of employment. 72 The defendant, however, allegedly had told
the employee that he would be discharged only for incompetent perform-
ance. 7' The federal district court found this allegation sufficient to deny
the defendant's motion for summary judgment, which was based on the
indefinite term of the relationship. The court stated:
[I]t is not clear, as a matter of law, that. . .[plaintiff's] contract
did not specify a duration of employment. A contract that fails to
specify the length of the term of employment, but that does set
conditions upon which termination may be based, is not termina-
ble at will-it is terminable upon the existence of those
conditions.
74
Thus it appears that the circumstances surrounding an employment rela-
tionship may be used to show a definite term as well as to show separate
consideration. Although the relationship between the definite term require-
ment and the separate consideration requirement is hazy, it appears that an
employee can prevail if he shows that either exists.
(3) lack of criticism of the employee's work; (4) the employer's assurances to the
employee regarding job security; and (5) the employer's termination policies. Id
66. Proof that the parties contracted with reference to a definite term often
requires factors similar to those used to show that the employee provided separate
consideration for the employer's promise to fire him for cause only. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 442 comment a (1958).
67. 627 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1980).
68. Id at 212-13.
69. Id at 213.
70. Id (quoting 1A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 152 (1963)).
71. 501 F. Supp. 727 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
72. Id at 732.
73. Id
74. Id The court just as easily could have held that the employer's representa-
tions gave rise to an obligation on the employer's part to discharge the employee
only for good cause. See generally notes 41-45 and accompanying text supra.
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The definite term requirement also has created problems when em-
ployment is "for life" or "permanent."7 5 The traditional view is that per-
manent or life employment relationships are terminable at will unless the
employee has given separate consideration."6 "Permanent" employment
thus is not considered to be for a definite term. Some authority exists, how-
ever, for enforcing permanent or lifetime agreements, 7 7 even though the
employee did not give separate consideration for the employer's promise.
7 8
The difficulty of proving these agreements, however, remains a formidable
obstacle to an employee's claim.
79
4. Statute of Frauds as a Defense
Employers often assert the statute of frauds as a defense to claims that
they contracted to discharge an employee only for good cause. Since most
employment relationships are not reduced to writing, the statute of frauds
often provides employers with a valid defense to such claims.8" Typically, a
state statute of frauds will render an oral agreement unenforceable if its
term exceeds one year.8 ' The typical statute, however, applies only to
agreements for a specific term of employment.8 Thus, an employee who
does not allege that he was hired for a specific term will not be barred by
the statute.83
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 442 comment d (1958) contem-
plates an enforceable agreement by the employer to employ his servant for life. It is
clear from the context, however, that this applies when the servant has given more
for the employer's promise than his services. See also Laird v. Eagle Iron Works, 249
N.W.2d 646, 647 (Iowa 1977) (agreement to employ permanently must be sup-
ported by consideration such as reciprocal promise to serve permanently).
76. See, e.g., Laird v. Eagle Iron Works, 249 N.W.2d 646, 647 (Iowa 1977); Mil-
ligan v. Union Corp., 87 Mich. App. 179, 182, 274 N.W.2d 10, 12 (1978); Mau v.
Omaha Nat'l Bank, 207 Neb. 308, 313, 299 N.W.2d 147, 150 (1980); Savarese v.
Pyrene Mfg. Co., 9 NJ. 595, 600, 89 A.2d 237, 239 (1952).
77. See, e.g., McKinney v. National Dairy Council, 491 F. Supp. 1108, 1110-11
(D. Mass. 1980) (dicta); Rogozinski v. Airstream by Angell, 152 NJ. Super. 133,
143-44, 377 A.2d 807, 812-13 (Law Div. 1977).
78. See, e.g., McKinney v. National Dairy Council, 491 F. Supp. 1108, 1110-11
(D. Mass. 1980) (dicta).
79. See Rogozinski v. Airstream by Angell, 152 N.J. Super. 133, 143, 377 A.2d
807, 812 (Law Div. 1977).
80. See, e.g., Morsinkhoff v. DeLuxe Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co., 344 S.W.2d
639, 642-43 (Mo. App., K.C. 1961). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 468 (1958).
81. See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 432.010 (1978).
82. See Halsell v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 518 F. Supp. 694, 696-97 (E.D. Ark.
1981) (applying Wisconsin law); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich.
579, 612 n.24, 292 N.W.2d 880, 891 n.24 (1980). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 468 comment a (1958).
83. The employee, while escaping the employer's statute of frauds defense, still
would be terminable at will in most jurisdictions because of the indefinite term of
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Some courts hold that the statute bars enforcement of alleged non-
written employment contracts if there is a possibility that the contract will
remain executory for more than one year. 4 Those courts bar an action on
such employment relationships even if the discharge is within the first year
of the relationship. 5 Other courts adopt a less sweeping interpretation of
the statute of frauds. In Rowe v. Noren Pattern andFoundy Co. ,6 the Michigan
Court of Appeals held that an oral agreement that the employee would not
be fired without good cause was not void under the statute of frauds since it
could be completed within one year.87 Rather than concentrating on how
long the relationship might last, the court focused on the possibility that the
agreement could be completed within one year.
88
An employee may overcome an employer's otherwise valid statute of
frauds defense by showing that he relied on the employer in some reason-
able fashion.89 The Rowe court noted that the employee could circumvent
the employer's statute of frauds defense by showing that the employee had
given up a secure job and pension rights to accept the employer's offer. 90
This is in line with the maxim that "a party cannot use the statute of frauds
to further a fraud."9 ' The employee still must prove that he is entitled to
contractual job security rights, however, even if he successfully avoids the
employer's statute of frauds defense.
92
the employment relationship. See, e.g., Halsell v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 518 F.
Supp. 694, 696-97 (E.D. Ark. 1981). See also note 64 and accompanying text supra.
84. See, e.g., Morsinkhoff v. DeLuxe Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co., 344 S.W.2d
639, 642 (Mo. App., K.C. 1961).
85. See id.
86. 91 Mich. App. 254, 283 N.W.2d 713 (1979).
87. Id at 257, 283 N.W.2d at 715. Alternatively, the court could have held
that the statute of frauds was not applicable because the employee did not allege a
specific period of employment. See generally Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield,
408 Mich. 579, 612 n.24, 292 N.W.2d 880, 891 n.24 (1980) (statute of frauds does
not bar actions on indefinite term contracts). This would not have defeated the
employee's claim because the court based its holding for the employee on his detri-
mental reliance. 91 Mich. App. at 263, 283 N.W.2d at 718.
88. 91 Mich. App. at 257, 283 N.W.2d at 715. The Rowe court noted the possi-
bility that the employee could be discharged for cause within one year.
89. See, e.g., id.; Schipani v. Ford Motor Co., 102 Mich. App. 606, 612-15, 302
N.W.2d 307, 310-11 (1981). See also cases cited Annot., 60 A.L.R.3d 226, 317-20
(1974).
90. 91 Mich. App. at 257, 283 N.W.2d at 715.
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139 (1981).
92. See Schipani v. Ford Motor Co., 102 Mich. App. 606, 302 N.W.2d 307
(1981). The Schipani court noted that if the employee was terminable at will, he
would not have a claim even though the court "estopped" the employer from assert-




Foster: Foster: Employment at Will:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1983
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
5. Employer's Standards as Part of the Employment Contract
The employer's battle is not lost when a court finds the employer has a
contractual duty to discharge his employee only for cause. Employers have
weakened or prevented legal challenges to discharges by requiring clearly
that, as a condition of continued employment, the employee must satisfy
the employer's rules and performance standards. Several courts have held
that an employee's failure to meet his employer's performance standards is
adequate cause for dismissal.9" The employer, in effect, defines "good
cause" instead of leaving that determination to the court. If the factfinder
determines that the employee failed to meet the employer's standards, the
employer has a valid defense to the employee's claim.94 Courts may not
allow ambiguous or unenforced work rules to serve as grounds for dis-
charge.9 5 Courts also may hold that an employer's self-imposed standards
are the only grounds on which he can terminate the employee,9 6 although
the weight of authority is against this interpretation.97 Because of the grow-
93. See, e.g., Smith v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 370 So. 2d 283, 286 (Ala.
1979) (failure to cooperate with drug investigation in violation of employer's rules);
Hollowell v. Career Decisions, Inc., 100 Mich. App. 561, 569, 298 N.W.2d 915, 920
(1980) ("employer's standard of job performance can be made part of the con-
tract"); McIntyre v. Fort Vancouver Plywood Co., 24 Wash. App. 120, 127, 600
P.2d 619, 623 (1979) (employee refused to work in violation of employer's
workrules).
94. "Breach of the employer's uniformly applied rules is a breach of the con-
tract and cause for discharge. . . . [Tihe question for the jury is whether the em-
ployer actually had a rule or policy and whether the employee was discharged for
violating it." Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 624, 292
N.W.2d 880, 897 (1980).
95. See, e.g., Bautch v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 278 N.W.2d 328, 330-31 (Minn.
1979) (discharge for violation of rule against taking food without paying found im-
proper because employer acquiesced in previous violations and rule was vague).
96. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 618-19, 292
N.W.2d 880, 893-94 (1980) (employer bound by past policy statements regarding
termination practices). Cf H. Vincent Allen & Assocs. v. Weis, 63 Ill. App. 3d 285,
295, 379 N.E.2d 765, 772 (1978) (90-day termination notice policy enforceable by
employee); Langdon v. Saga Corp., 569 P.2d 524, 528 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976) (em-
ployment manual provisions constituted offer for unilateral contract binding on em-
ployer when employee accepted by continuing his employment).
97. See H. Vincent Allen & Assocs. v. Weis, 63 Ill. App. 3d 285, 294-95, 379
N.E.2d 765, 772 (1978) (delineation of certain causes for termination does not bar
discharge for other good cause); Zagar v. Field Enterprises Educ. Corp., 58 Ill. App.
3d 750, 752-53, 374 N.E.2d 897, 899 (1978) (interoffice memorandum concerning
conditions for terminating employee did not limit employer to those conditions);
Edwards v. Citibank, N.A., 74 A.D.2d 553, 554, 425 N.Y.S.2d 327, 328 (1980) (staff
handbooks not an employment contract because employer unilaterally could
change provisions); Williams v. Biscuitville, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 405, 408, 253 S.E.2d
18, 20 (1979) (discipline policy stated in operations manual was unilateral policy
that employer could change any time, not contractual right of employee); Speciale
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ing restrictions on the at will doctrine, employers may turn more frequently
to defining "cause" sufficient for discharge.
98
6. The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Some courts have imposed on employers an implied in law covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in their employment relationships.9 9 This cove-
nant is really a court-imposed obligation to refrain from interfering arbi-
trarily with the employee's enjoyment of the benefits of his employment.' 0
Essentially, a court that imposes such a duty creates an ongoing relationship
by raising obstacles to termination by the employer. The covenant has
been applied to employment at will relationships.'
0
'
In Cleay v. American Airlines, 102 the California Court of Appeals held
that a discharged at will employee stated a cause of action because the em-
ployer violated the "implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing
contained in all contracts, including employment contracts."'0 3 The court
stated that discharging an eighteen-year veteran employee "without legal
cause . . . offends the implied-in-law covenant."' 4 The court noted that
the employer could assert as a defense that he had in fact exercised good
faith and fair dealing with his employee.'0 5 Thus, the Cleay court limited
employers' discretion to discharge employees'0 6 by requiring adherence to a
v. Tektronix, Inc., 38 Or. App. 441, 443-44, 590 P.2d 734, 736 (1979) (policies limit
employer's right to discharge only if part of employment contract).
98. Courts that restrict the impact of the employment at will doctrine still may
defer to the employer's definition of "causes" for discharge. Thus, these courts al-
low the employer to expand his options beyond what the court would allow in the
absence of such a definition. Employers who delineate causes for discharge "must
be permitted to establish their own standards for job performance and to dismiss
[employees] for non-adherence to those standards although another employer or the
jury might have established lower standards [of job performance]." Toussaint v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 623, 292 N.W.2d 880, 897 (1980).
99. See McKinney v. National Dairy Council, 491 F. Supp. 1108, 1118 (D.
Mass. 1980); Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 455, 168 Cal. Rptr.
722, 729 (1980); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 102, 364
N.E.2d 1251, 1256 (1977).
100. See Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 455, 168 Cal. Rptr.
722, 729 (1980).
101. See id
102. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
103. Id
104. Id
105. Id at 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
106. A narrow reading of the case might indicate that the court actually held
that the parties had entered into a contractual agreement. The court emphasized
the length of the employee's service and the employer's general policy concerning
discharge in finding that the employee stated a claim for breach of contract. Id
The court's lengthy discussion of employment at will relationships probably indi-
cates that it meant to include employment at will relationships within its holding.
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court-imposed covenant of good faith. 107
When courts have imposed an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing on parties to an employment relationship, additional outcome-in-
fluencing factors also have been present.1 0 8 A court most likely will not
apply such a covenant to employment relationships unless it can bolster its
decision with other factors.109
B. Tort Law
Most of the defenses available to an employer in an action for breach
of an employment contract are unavailable under tort law. Thus, employ-
ees have resorted to tort theories to avoid contract law defenses such as lack
of consideration or the statute of frauds. An action in tort also may be
possible when an employee has waived his rights under a contract.
1 10
Moreover, tort actions hold the potential for a greater range of relief than
contract actions."' Some courts have held that the same set of facts may
give rise to both contract and tort actions." 
2
1. Wrongful Discharge
Several states now recognize a cause of action for "wrongful" or "abu-
sive" discharge." 3 Some courts have stated that the action is grounded in
Id at 448-54, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 725-28. Thus, the court continued the confusion
surrounding the legal nature of employment at will relationships by treating them
as contracts. See general/y notes 28-30 and accompanying text supra.
107. It is unclear what the court meant when it said the employer must "exercise
good faith and fair dealing." 111 Cal. App. 3d at 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729. The
court merely held that an 18-year veteran of the employer's workforce could be
discharged only for "legal" cause. Id
108. In Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917
(1981), the California Court of Appeals noted that the Cleaq court "did not base its
holding upon the covenant of good faith and fair dealing alone. Its decision rested
also upon . . .[other factors]." Id at 329, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927.
109. See, e.g., McKinney v. National Dairy Council, 491 F. Supp. 1108, 1117 (D.
Mass. 1980) (employer made oral representations of job security to employee);
Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 445, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 729
(1980) (employer instituted specific discharge procedure).
110. Seegeneral/ Note, supra note 20, at 1455-56.
111. See, e.g., Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 72, 417 A.2d
505, 512 (1980) (punitive damages).
112. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 174-75, 610 P.2d
1330, 1334, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 843 (1980).
113. See Perks y. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363, 1366 (3d Cir.
1979) (Pennsylvania law); Pstragowski v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 553 F.2d 1, 2-3
(1st Cir. 1977) (New Hampshire law); Placos v. Cosmair, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 1287,
1289 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (New York law); Meyer v. Byron Jackson, Inc., 120 Cal. App.
3d 59, 60 n.1, 174 Cal. Rptr. 428, 429 n.1 (1981); Adler v. American Standard
Corp., 290 Md. 615, -, 432 A.2d 464, 473 (1981). But see Phillips v. Goodyear Tire
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contract law. 14 It seems clear, however, that most courts recognizing such
actions base them on principles of tort law."' Generally, the basis for such
actions seems to be the employer's contravention of some state policy,"
6
but the employer's subjective motives may be equally important in a tort
action for wrongful discharge." 
7
In Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 's the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit held that Pennsylvania law recognized ac-
tions for "tortious discharge.""' 9 The employer allegedly had discharged
the employee because he refused to submit to a polygraph examination.
The court found that the employee stated a cause of action because the
employer's action violated Pennsylvania's public policy against employers
forcing employees to submit to such tests. 2 °
2. Prima Facie Tort Doctrine
Discharged employees have asserted the prima facie tort doctrine as a
ground for relief in discharge disputes.1 2 ' New York has applied the doc-
trine to employment relationships. In Wegman v. Daiylea Cooperative,'22 an
employee discharge dispute, the Appellate Division defined a prima facie
tort as "the infliction of intentional harm, resulting in damages, without
excuse or justification, by an act or series of acts which would otherwise be
lawful."' 2 3 The court held that the employee did not have a cause of action
& Rubber Co., 651 F.2d 1051, 1055-56 (5th Cir. 1981) (Georgia and Texas law do
not recognize wrongful discharge action either in tort or contract).
114. See Pstragowski v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 553 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1977)
(wrongful discharge is breach of contract under New Hampshire law); Meyer v.
Byron Jackson, Inc., 120 Cal. App. 3d 59,60 n.1, 174 Cal. Rptr. 428, 429 n.1 (1981)
(wrongful discharge sounds both in tort and contract law).
115. See Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363, 1366 (3d Cir.
1979); Placos v. Cosmair, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 1287, 1289 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Adler v.
American Standard Corp., 290 Md. 615, -, 432 A.2d 464, 473 (1981).
116. See, e.g., Adler v. American Standard Corp., 290 Md. 615, -, 432 A.2d 464,
473 (1981) (Maryland recognizes cause of action for abusive discharge of at will
employee if discharge "contravenes some clear mandate of public policy.").
117. See notes 130-39 and accompanying text infra.
118. 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979).
119. Id at 1366.
120. Id Pennsylvania, by statute, made an employer guilty of a misdemeanor if
he conditioned his employees' jobs on submission to polygraph tests. The court held
that this expression of policy in a criminal statute was sufficient to afford civil relief
to an employee who had been victimized by such a practice. Id at 1365-66.
121. See, e.g., McCullough v. Certain Teed Products Corp., 70 A.D.2d 771, 771,
417 N.Y.S.2d 353, 354 (1979); Wegman v. Dairylea Cooperative, 50 A.D.2d 108,
114, 376 N.Y.S.2d 728, 735 (1975). For a good discussion of the prima facie tort
doctrine, see 47 Mo. L. REv. 553 (1982).
122. 50 A.D.2d 108, 376 N.Y.S.2d 728 (1975).
123. Id at 114, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 735 (citations omitted).
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"because: (1) plaintiff failed to allege special damages ... ; and (2) plain-
tiff failed to allege a specific intent [of the employer] to harm."' 124
In McCullough . Certain Teed Products Corp. ,125 the employer appealed
from an order denying his motion to dismiss an employee's prima facie tort
action for wrongful discharge. The New York Appellate Division held that
the trial court's action was proper.1 26 The issue was whether the complaint
adequately alleged actual damages, and the court held that such damages
had been stated adequately.
27
The New York doctrine is important. It provides discharged employ-
ees with a tort cause of action even if the discharge was lawful. The only
requirement is that the employee's harm, which can be lost wages, 128 must
have been "intentionally inflicted."'' 2
9
A recent Missouri appellate decision, Porter v. Crawford & Co. ,130
adopted the prima facie tort doctrine as Missouri law. The defendant in
Porter stopped payment on its check to the plaintiff. The plaintiff was dam-
aged because he wrote checks on his account when, because of the stopped
payment of which he was unaware, the account had insufficient funds to
cover the checks. 3 1 The court held that the defendant's action, though
lawful,' 3 2 was actionable in tort if it was done with an intent to cause injury
to the plaintiff. 3 The court set forth the elements of a prima facie tort:
"1. Intentional lawful act by the defendant. 2. An intent to cause injury to
the plaintiff. 3. Injury to the plaintiff. 4. An absence of any justification or
an insufficient justification for the defendant's act."' 3 4
The Porter opinion explained the intent necessary to state a claim
under the theory by saying that "[t]he burden of proof [is] upon the plain-
tiff to show an intent to injure, not merely an intentional act."' 35 The nar-
row "intent to injure" requirement may limit Porter's impact. The opinion
also leaves defendants with the defense of justification.' 3 6 Thus, an em-
ployer faced with a prima facie tort action probably could defend by show-
ing good cause to discharge.
124. Id (citations omitted).
125. 70 A.D.2d 771, 417 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1979).
126. Id at 771, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 354.
127. Id
128. See McCullough v. Certain Teed Products Corp., 70 A.D.2d 771, 771, 417
N.Y.S.2d 353, 354 (1979).
129. See note 123 and accompanying text supra.
130. 611 S.W.2d 265 (Mo. App., W.D. 1980), noted in 47 Mo. L. REV. 553
(1982).
131. 611 S.W.2d at 267.
132. Id at 267-68.
133. Id at 272. The court relied on several New York decisions, the RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 (1965), and Mo. CONST. art. I, § 14.
134. 611 S.W.2d at 268.
135. Id at 272.
136. Id at 273.
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The prima facie tort action may significantly modify the doctrine of
employment at will in Missouri. Porter makes lawful acts actionable.1 37 It
remains to be seen how broadly Missouri courts will apply the doctrine.
Although Porter was not an employee discharge case, the court's formulation
seems to include all legal acts. Thus, the discharge of an at will employee,
although seemingly lawful in Missouri,"' may be grounds for recovery."'
3. Other Tort Actions
Several recent cases have recognized an action for tortious interference
with an employee's employment relationship."4° If a person intentionally
causes an employer to terminate the employment relationship, he can be
held liable for damages caused to the employee.' 41 An employee can re-
cover for such interference even though his employment is at will.'4 2 An
employer, however, almost certainly is immune from such actions. In
O'Neillv. ARA Services,'14 the employee sued the employer and certain man-
agement personnel for conspiring to interfere with his employment relation-
ship. The court held for the employer, stating that "an employer cannot be
said to conspire to induce breach of its own employment contract or termi-
nate its own employment relationship."" Thus, the employee must find
another defendant to sue under this theory.
The employee can bring a tortious interference action against a fellow
servant if the servant caused the employee's employment relationship to be
terminated.' 45 This action will fail, however, unless the fellow servant was
acting for personal reasons and not in the employer's interest.1
46
A discharged employee may sue his employer for interference with pro-
spective employment relations. The basic theory of such an action is that
the employer, by discharging the employee, has interfered with the em-
137. Id. at 268.
138. See note 4 supra.
139. New York has applied the prima facie tort doctrine to employment rela-
tionships. See, e.g., McCullough v. Certain Teed Products Corp., 70 A.D.2d 771,
771, 417 N.Y.S.2d 353, 354 (1979).
140. See Casterline v. Stuerman, 588 S.W.2d 86, 88 (Mo. App., E.D. 1979);
Campbell v. Ford Indus., Inc., 274 Or. 243, 252 n.8, 546 P.2d 141, 147 n.8 (1976).
141. See Casterline v. Stuerman, 588 S.W.2d 86, 88-89 (Mo. App., E.D. 1979).
142. See, e.g., cases cited note 140 supra. But see Standley v. Kelley, 422 N.E.2d
663, 667 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
143. 457 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
144. Id at 188.
145. See Campbell v. Ford Indus., Inc., 274 Or. 243, 257, 546 P.2d 141, 149-50
(1976) (cause of action stated when fellow employees induced employer to discharge
employee because of personal motives).
146. Id See also O'Neill v. ARA Servs., 457 F. Supp. 182, 188 (E.D. Pa. 1978)
(management employees privileged to interfere in employee relationship if not act-
ing solely in own interest).
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ployee's "prospect of obtaining employment." '14  In Schipiani v. Ford Motor
Co. ,148 the Michigan Court of Appeals held that such an action could be
maintained, 4 9 but the court limited the employee's action by requiring
him to show that his relationship with the employer was not at will 0 and
that his expectation of prospective employment was specific and reason-
able.' 5 ' The court held that since the employee had not asserted a specific
and reasonable economic advantage that was injured by the employer's ac-
tions, the employee had failed to assert a claim upon which relief could be
granted. 
5 2
In Schipani, the employee also asserted that the employer had failed to
objectively review the employee's job performance, causing the employee to
be denied a promotion.' 53 In effect, the employee was suing the employer
for negligently reviewing his job performance. The court stated that the
employer was under no duty to evaluate the employee's performance. If the
employer undertook such a review, however, the court held that the em-
ployer was required to "exercise some degree of skill" in reviewing that per-
formance.' 5 4 As with the employee's claim for interference with a
prospective employment relationship, the court held that the employee
stated a claim for negligent review only if he prevailed on his claim that the
employer was under -a contractual duty to fire him only for cause.'
55
IV. THE "PUBLIC POLICY BALANCING TEST"'
In analyzing the rights of parties in an employment relationship, courts
often blur the line between contract and tort.' 5 6 In fact, some courts have
held that the same circumstances support actions in both areas.' 57 Some
courts, however, now are awarding discharged employees damages based on
an employer's failure to conform to public policy standards.'
58
147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B comment c (1965).
148. 102 Mich. App. 606, 302 N.W.2d 307 (1981).
149. Id at 621, 302 N.W.2d at 314.
150. Id This result seems somewhat anomalous because the employee is not
suing for interference with his present employment relationship.
151. Id at 621-23, 302 N.W.2d at 314.
152. Id at 622-23, 302 N.W.2d at 314.
153. Id at 623, 302 N.W.2d at 314-15.
154. Id at 623-24, 302 N.W.2d at 315.
155. Id at 624, 302 N.W.2d at 315.
156. See Blackburn, supra note 19, at 473; notes 28-30 and accompanying text
supra.
157. See, e.g., Meyer v. Byron Jackson, Inc., 120 Cal. App. 3d 59, 60 n.1, 174 Cal.
Rptr. 428, 429 n.1 (1981).
158. See Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 176, 610 P.2d 1330,
1335, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 844 (1980); Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d
443, 450, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 726 (1980); Milligan v. Union Corp., 87 Mich. App.
179, 182, 274 N.W.2d 10, 12 (1978) (dicta); O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J. Super.
416, 418-19, 390 A.2d 149, 150 (Law Div. 1978). Public policy principles are ap-
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These courts use a balancing test to determine whether the circum-
stances of a particular discharge are offensive to the public policy of their
states. Courts continue to discuss actions in traditional contract and tort
terms, but it is clear that public policy is at the heart of the cause of action.
In O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 15 9 the New Jersey Superior Court indicated that a
cause of action based on public policy might be stated when an at will
employee was discharged for refusal to perform medical procedures for
which she was unqualified. The court stated that three factors were impor-
tant in deciding whether the employer's action offended the public policy of
New Jersey: (1) whether the employer knew or should have known that he
was requesting his employee to perform an illegal act; (2) the seriousness of
the violation that would have occurred if the employee had followed orders;
and (3) the reasonablenss of the parties' actions.1 60
In Tamey v. Atlantic Richfield Co. ,161 an employee was fired after he re-
fused to engage in an illegal price fixing scheme. He brought an action
alleging breach of employment contract and tortious wrongful discharge.
162
The California Supreme Court held that "an employer's authority over its
employee does not include the right to demand that the employee commit a
criminal act to further its interests, and an employer may not coerce com-
pliance with such unlawful directions by discharging an employee who re-
fuses to follow such an order."'16'  Although the court expressed the
employee's right in traditional contract and tort terms, 164 it is clear that the
actual basis of the court's opinion was its feeling that California's public
policies required that employers be punished for attempting to force em-
ployees to do illegal acts.
1 65
The scope of the public policy exception to the employment at will
plied within the general framework of tort law. The public policy test, however, is
distinct from more traditional tort concepts which focus on individual intentions.
Moreover, public policy is recognized by courts as a distinct principle in the law of
employment relationships. Therefore, a separate analysis of public policy claims is
essential for a complete delineation of actions available to discharged employees.
159. 160 N.J. Super. 416, 390 A.2d 149 (Law Div. 1978).
160. Id at 419, 390 A.2d at 150. The court emphasized that New Jersey's public
policy favoring sound health care was implicated directly.
161. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
162. Id at 170-71, 610 P.2d at 1331-32, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 840-41.
163. Id at 178, 610 P.2d at 1336-37, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 846.
164. The court stated that the wrongful discharge "may afford both tort and the
contractual relief, and in such circumstances the existence of the contractual rela-
tionship will not bar the injured party from pursuing redress in tort." Id at 174-75,
610 P.2d at 1334, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
165. The concurring opinion best illustrates the Tameny court's focus on Califor-
nia public policy rather than traditional tort and contract principles. After stating
his view that the employee's right of action had a clear statutory base, Judge Ma-
nuel disagreed with the court's reasoning saying, "I see no reason to search further
for . . . [an action for the employee] among the vague and ill-defined dictates of
19831
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doctrine is not unlimited. In Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. ,166 the New
Jersey Supreme Court held that a discharged at will employee could state a
cause of action based on public policy only "when the discharge is contrary
to a clear mandate of public policy."' 6 7 The court restricted the range of
actionable public policy violations to those that violate specfic expressions of
public policy such as legislation, administrative rules, regulations, decisions,
and case law.' 68 An employer still can discharge an at will employee if his
action does not offend such specific policies. 6 9
Not all courts recognize public policy exceptions to the at will doc-
trine.' 70 Courts have denied relief to employees who were discharged for
warning of unsafe products 17 1 and for filing petitions in bankruptcy.' 72
Many courts, however, seem to be moving toward a balancing test in deter-
mining the validity of employee discharges when the employee alleges that
the employer has violated public policy.
The test of public policy violation weighs the interests of the employer,
the employee, and the public. No hard and fast rule can be stated for deter-
mining when an employer violates public policy by discharging an at will
employee. The court must evaluate the particular public policy involved in
each case and must weigh that policy against the employer's interest in run-
ning his business.'
73
V. PROBLEMS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE CURRENT JUDICIAL
APPROACH
The employment relationship certainly is one of the most important
relationships in our society. Achieving some measure of certainty with re-
gard to employers' and employees' rights and duties is important. Unfortu-
nately, this certainty has not yet been achieved.
To an employer or employee, recent case law presents a bewildering
array of theories and defenses in a discharge situation. Employers' and em-
ployees' rights theoretically are governed by three distinct areas of law:
fundamental public policy." Id at 179, 610 P.2d at 1337, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 846
(Manuel, J., concurring).
166. 84 NJ. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980).
167. Id at 71, 417 A.2d at 512.
168. Id
169. Id
170. See, e.g., Phillips v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 651 F.2d 1051, 1055-56
(5th Cir. 1981).
171. See Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 178, 319 A.2d 174, 180
(1974).
172. See McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d 919, 929 (5th Cir.
1977); West v. First Nat'l Bank, 145 Ga. App. 808, 808, 245 S.E.2d 46, 47 (1978).
173. See Percival v. General Motors Corp., 400 F. Supp. 1322, 1323 (E.D. Mo.
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agency, contract, and tort. However, courts fail to distinguish these areas
adequately when adjudicating employers' and employees' rights. Courts
have moved away from requiring specific contractual understandings when
employees can show other persuasive factors that justify contractual relief.
They also have broadened employers' tort liability exposure, in some cases
requiring only a showing that state public policy has been violated. Thus a
smorgasbord of relief now is available to a discharged employee.
One's initial impression might be that employees now are better off.
Employees' interests, however, may be impaired rather than enhanced by
the courts' new solicitousness. As courts more readily afford discharged em-
ployees relief, employers will respond by tightening their dealings with em-
ployees. For example, employers may be more reluctant to implement
generous personnel policies for fear that they will be legally bound to ad-
here to such policies in all situations. This could make it harder to attack a
discharge. Because of the cost of litigation, employees with little or no
money will not benefit from the new approaches.' 74 These employees will
have to accept less desirable terms of employment without gaining the ben-
efits of the courts' new approach.
It is clear that an increasing number of courts are resolving employee
discharge disputes by resorting to the public policy balancing test. This
trend undoubtedly will continue. The test, however, seems misplaced. As
the New Jersey Supreme Court noted in Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp. ,175 to satisfy the public policy test an employee must show that his
discharge involves a violation of some state or federal law.176 Yet remedies
normally are available, independent of wrongful discharge actions, to re-
dress violations of such state or federal laws.' 7 7 In supplementing those
remedies, the courts may thwart the legislative body's original goals. For
example, by allowing the employee recovery where the employer's actions
also constituted an unfair labor practice under federal law, the court in
Cleay v. American Airlines"17 may have thwarted the purposes of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act-to promote stability in labor relations. In a
field that is regulated so heavily, courts might do well to confine their in-
quiry to the issue of whether the parties entered into binding contractual
relations. Clearly, the courts should leave to the national and state legisla-
tures the primary task of shaping public policies governing termination of
employment relationships.
174. Most cases in which discharges have been challenged on the basis of some
contract or tort theory have involved management or similarly situated employees.
See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917
(1981) (plaintiff was long term senior management employee).
175. 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980).
176. Id at 71, 417 A.2d at 512.
177. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976).
178. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
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VI. CONCLUSION
- Judicial approaches to the employment at will doctrine range across a
broad spectrum. Some courts continue to adhere to the traditional doc-
trine. Most courts, however, now are limiting the operation of the employ-
ment at will doctrine. The varying judicial approaches involved in the
general trend toward limitation of the doctrine have rendered the status of
employers and employees one of substantial uncertainty. It is an open ques-
tion whether the judicial "cures" are better than the common law "disease."
In approaching employment at will issues, courts should look beyond the
initial appeal of the new approaches to the underlying doctrine and con-
sider the ultimate impact that such approaches will have upon the parties
to an employment relationship.
ROBIN V. FOSTER
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